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With a Little SUPPORT from our Friends: Children, Trials and Bioethics. 
 
Angus Dawson and Paul Baines 
 
 
From the perspective of the other side of the Atlantic, it looks as if a new 
American Civil War has begun. Skirmish follows skirmish in an indecisive conflict 
in the blogosphere and on the letters page of the New England Journal of 
Medicine: two opposed camps of clinicians and bioethicists engaged on the field 
of battle. One group applauds the recent US Office for Human Research 
Protection’s (OHRP’s) judgment in relation to claimed inadequacies in the 
informed consent documentation in the Surfactant, Positive Pressure, and 
Oxygenation Randomized Trial (SUPPORT)1, whilst the other suggests the OHRP 
was mistaken and that the judgment fails to consider the issues of risks fairly and 
fails to consider the implications for medical research on children more 
generally.2 We know and respect bioethicists in both camps, and do not write 
simply to add force to one side or another. Instead, we wish to step back from 
details and make some broader points about the nature of research ethics, 
particularly relating to children. We start with the cultural observation that it 
seems odd that two groups of respected academics can disagree so profoundly 
on such fundamental matters. How could this come about, and what does it tell 
us about the nature of bioethics in the US? No doubt there are personal rivalries 
and antipathies between at least some members of the two groups, but this 
cannot explain the radically different conclusions about this trial. There are also 
perhaps different ideas at work here about the nature and purpose of bioethics. 
Is it academic (to explore concepts and arguments), collaborative (working with 
clinicians to improve medical practice and research), or should it have more of 
an advocacy role (focused on critiquing pharmaceutical companies and their 
influence in medicine and other current practices)? Given what we know about 
some of the signatories to the two NEJM letters, this is certainly one influence. 
However, we need to begin at the beginning. What was SUPPORT? 
 
SUPPORT was conducted by a cross-US team of researchers supported by the 
Eunice Kennedy Shriver National Institute of Child Health and Human 
Development. For some time it has been appreciated that both too little and too 
much oxygen delivered to babies with breathing problems is harmful, but the 
optimal oxygen level was unknown. The SUPPORT trial was designed to answer 
this question for premature babies. In the trial conducted in the US from 2005 to 
2009, published in 2010, severely premature infants (under 28 weeks gestation, 
but of at least 24 weeks gestation) were randomly assigned to oxygen saturation 
target levels within a range of either 85-89% or 91-95%.3 Across the US and the 
                                                 
1 Macklin, R. et al. The OHRP and SUPPORT – Another View. N Engl J Med 
2013;369:e3. DOI: 10.1056/NEJMc1308015 
2 Wilfond, BS. et al. The OHRP and SUPPORT. N Engl J Med 2013;368:e36. DOI: 
10.1056/NEJMc1307008 
3 SUPPORT Study Group of the Eunice Kennedy Shriver NICHD Neonatal 
Research Network. Target Ranges of Oxygen Saturation in Extremely Preterm 
Infants. N Engl J Med 2010;362:1959-69 
rest of the world, both of these oxygen saturation target levels were in 
widespread use within clinical practice and no definitive evidence existed about 
which was preferable.4 Consent was obtained from parents or guardians before 
the birth of the child. The primary outcome was the development of damage to 
the eyes, often resulting in blinding, called retinopathy of prematurity (ROP) or 
death before hospital discharge. At the end of the trial, with 1316 infants 
enrolled, no significant difference was found between the two groups in the 
primary endpoint (found in 28.3% of those in the low saturation group and 
32.1% of those in the high saturation group). However, the composite primary 
endpoint concealed a higher mortality in the low saturation group (19.9% 
contrasted with 16.2%) which was compensated by a lower incidence of severe 
ROP in the low saturation group (8.6% versus 17.9%).5 Mortality remained 
higher in the low oxygen saturation group when the children were 
neurodevelopmentally assessed at 18-22 months (22.1% compared with a 
mortality of 18.2% in the high oxygen saturation group).6 
 
That this was an important trial is beyond doubt. Severely premature infants 
have a significant chance of dying, and those that do not die are often left with 
severe impairment.7 A large multinational (UK, Australia, NZ) trial, BOOST II, 
using the same oxygen saturation targets (85-89% and 91-95%) running from 
2006 closed early following an interim analysis of 2315 enrolled infants 
(including the 1316 infants enrolled in SUPPORT) that demonstrated a very 
significantly higher mortality in infants treated with the lower oxygen saturation 
targets of 85-89%.8 As a result of these studies, clinical practice in relation to the 
management of premature babies has changed. 
 
This might have served as a paradigmatic example of how international, 
collaborative clinical research can benefit individuals and communities, if it 
ended there, but the US Office for Human Research Protection (OHRP), the 
organisation given the responsibility of enforcing US federal research 
regulations, pursued an investigation after allegations of inadequate consent 
procedures in the SUPPORT study. In a letter setting out their findings the OHRP 
reprimanded the researchers and claimed that ‘the conduct of this study was in 
violation of the regulatory requirements for informed consent, stemming from 
the failure to describe the reasonably foreseeable risks of blindness, neurological 
                                                 
4 The study also (in a factorial design) allocated infants randomly to intubation 
with early surfactant administration, or early continuous positive airway 
pressure (CPAP). However, this part of the research was reported separately, 
and has not been the subject of any criticised, so we set it to one side. 
5 SUPPORT Study Group, op cit. 
6 Vaucher YE, Peralta-Carcelen M, Finer NN, et al. Neurodevelopmental Outcomes 
in the Early CPAP and Pulse Oximetry Trial. N Engl J Med 2012;367:2495-504. 
DOI: 10.1056/NEJMoa1208506 
7 Morley CJ. CPAP and Low Oxygen Saturation for Very Preterm Babies? N Engl J 
Med 2013 362;2024-5 
8 The BOOST II United Kingdom, Australia, and New Zealand Collaborative 
Groups. Oxygen Saturation and Outcomes in Preterm Infants. N Engl J Med 
2013;368:2094-104. DOI: 10.1056/NEJMoa1302298 
damage and death’. They state that the information sheet should have made clear 
that neonates participating in the study could have received a different level of 
oxygen from those not involved in the study and that this ‘could increase the risk 
of brain injury or death’.9 However, a number of clinicians and bioethicists 
objected to this judgment, suggesting that it required the researchers to notify 
the participants about risks that they could not possibly have known about until 
after the SUPPORT data was analysed. The danger, on this view, is that the 
informed consent process is judged in retrospect to be inadequate, because of 
the very findings of the research itself.10 
 
As can now be fully appreciated, even determining the facts of this case is 
difficult. However, we don’t think that the dispute merely relates to the 
complexity of the trial. The disagreement is ultimately a normative one. The 
bioethics supporters of OHRP argue that the parents of the children involved 
should have been told more about various aspects of the study. Their focus is on 
the need to obtain adequate informed consent and presumably this can be 
supported by appeal to the central role that autonomy is often held to have in 
research ethics. The bioethics opponents of the OHRP judgment suggest that the 
information sheet and informed consent procedures were adequate, given the 
knowledge at the time of the initiation of the trial. They focus on the existing 
standard of care at that time (that ran across the whole range of the two 
saturation levels), the existence of disagreements between clinicians about what 
treatment option was best, and that, given these facts, participants in the trial 
were clearly no worse off than those who were not.11 The primary focus here is 
on benefit and harm. So, perhaps one source of disagreement between the two 
armies is a tendency to see different principles or values as being key to judging 
the appropriateness of this study, or indeed any research study. 
 
It is interesting that those supportive of the OHRP’s ruling do not seem to 
dispute that the research was prima facie necessary and worthwhile, they only 
focus on the issue of consent.12 However, some others clearly do think that 
                                                 
9 http://www.hhs.gov/ohrp/detrm_letrs/YR13/mar13a.pdf (accessed 15/8/13). 
However, it is worth noting that a subsequent letter has tried to minimise the 
implications of the initial findings for other research, although they affirm their 
finding about the nature of the SUPPORT consent process: 
http://www.hhs.gov/ohrp/detrm_letrs/YR13/jun13a.pdf (accessed 15/8/13) 
10 Drazen, JM. Et al. Informed consent and SUPPORT.  N Engl J Med 
2013;368:1929-31 and Magnus, D. & Caplan, AL. Risk, Consent, and SUPPORT. N 
Engl J Med 2013;368:1864-5. 
11 Indeed, it is interesting to note, as John D Lantos points out, that in retrospect 
we can see that participants in the trial were actually at an advantage because 
we can compare the reported results of the SUPPORT trial with the routine data 
collected on all premature infants.  
http://www.thehastingscenter.org/Bioethicsforum/Post.aspx?id=6306&blogid=
140 (accessed 15/8/13) 
12 Macklin et al, op cit. 
conducting such research on children is problematic in itself.13 But what is the 
alternative? Is it appropriate to require clinicians to make their decisions based 
upon their intuition or tradition instead? Isn’t it better to obtain clear and 
systematic answers about the relative merits of treatment options? The 
researchers should not be presented as Nazi experimenters, wanting to perform 
gruesome and pointless research on children. This was therapeutic research, 
where the relevant harm threshold for research participation was met, and 
significant benefit from improvements in treatments for children as a group.  
 
Given this disagreement, which value or principle should take priority? It seems 
odd to us to place such a focus on informed consent here. Indeed, one thing that 
the dispute perhaps reflects more than anything else is the curious prominence 
of informed consent in so much of the research ethics discourse. It seems to be 
forgotten that the actual participants were premature children, and therefore 
unable to consent themselves. So, those to be informed were the parents and 
guardians as proxy decision-makers for their children. Is it obvious that we 
should treat a parent’s consent on behalf of their child in just the same way that 
we would if they were consenting for themselves? We think not. Protecting 
children from potential research abuse requires a stronger emphasis on other 
ethical aspects than just consent. Even if we think that competent adults can look 
after their own interests, and should be permitted to expose themselves to any 
harm they wish, it does not follow that parents should be able to do the same for 
their children. It, therefore, seems odd to place consent at the centre of the 
dispute. Can parental consent, alone, legitimate an action that puts a child at risk 
of harm? Do parents alone have a right to determine that their children should 
participate in any research? Surely not. The key issue in research on children is 
not that of consent, but rather the fair assessment of harm related to 
participation in the research versus standard treatment. Parents may be given 
more or less information, or they may understand more or less of the 
information that is provided. But the central issue is about risks and this 
assessment is to be made by IRBs as well as (in this case) parents. Indeed, it 
might be argued that the primary obligation of an ethics committee is to ensure 
that participants are protected from unnecessary harm.14 We suggest that this 
obligation was clearly fulfilled in this case, and as far as we can make out, given 
the rather confusing expression of their views, the OHRP agree. 
 
Another common option for justifying interventions (including research) on 
children is to appeal to the idea of best interests.15 We presume that parents will 
act in the best interests of their children, but to what extent is best interests the 
relevant test here? Is it ever in the best interests of a child to be involved in 
research? This may be doubted, as it seems odd to think of the relative risks of 
                                                 
13 Public Citizen’s letter: http://www.citizen.org/documents/2111.pdf (accessed 
15/8/13) 
14 Garrard, E. & Dawson, A. What is the Role of the REC? Paternalism, 
Inducements and Harm in Research Ethics. J. Med Eth. 2005, 31:419-423. 
15 P. Allmark, S. Mason, A. Gill & C. Megone. Is it in a neonate’s best interest to 
enter a randomised controlled trial? J Med Ethics. 2001; 27: 110–113. 
participation and non-participation in this way. For SUPPORT it certainly seemed 
at the start of the trial that participation was no worse than non-participation or 
‘normal’ treatment, but it is a stretching the everyday meaning of the term to call 
participation in the ‘best interests’ of a child.  
 
There are important issues for us all to learn from the SUPPORT saga. One of the 
reasons this issue created such vociferous debate in the US is the role of the 
OHRP. This is a federal body with immense powers. The US’s system of 
conducting research ethics is unusually in many respects. It is essentially a legal 
system, not one focused on ethics. By this we mean that law must follow the 
rules as laid down in the relevant statute, whereas ethical judgment can allow for 
more flexibility and response to individual cases, it can weigh different ethical 
values or principles against each other. If the law says that an informed consent 
must be obtained, then it must be obtained. Arguably, complex ethical judgments 
about the justifiability of research cannot be captured by such an absolutist 
approach. There is a warning here for all research ethics regulators. 
 
The discussion of the SUPPORT trial brings out the fact that there is still no 
consensus on how research ought to be conducted on children, although it is 
almost universally held to be necessary. It is certainly the case that justifications 
for conducting research on children that appeal to the rights of the parents to 
decide or the idea of the ‘best interests’ of the child look grossly inadequate. 
Turning to the traditional magic bullet of bioethics, informed consent, hardly 
seems to be the answer either. Considerations of harm, is and ought to be, at the 
centre of the discussion. We don’t see any early end to the new American civil 
war going on in bioethics, but perhaps its time to go back to fundamentals. If we 
accept that research on children is ever necessary, what is it that justifies it? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
